Ⅰ. Introduction
" To error is human" , the monumental report published in 1999 by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), was the tipping point regarding the patient safety movement [1, 2] . After publishing the report, patient safety issues such as adverse events and medical errors have captured increasing attention from not only medical experts but the media and the general population [3] . In particular, considerable research regarding adverse events has been conducted across the world [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
Recently, however, it has been suggested that near miss-based analysis is much more meaningful than concentrating on an adverse event itself, as the industrial field does [9] . According to Heinrich's law, for every major injury (or adverse event), there are 30 minor injuries and 300 near misses [10] . Near miss is potential adverse event that was identified before it caused injury, illness, or damage to the patient [7] . Thus, to prevent future adverse events, systems should be improved appropriately through tracking and analyzing near misses [11] . That is, a near miss can function as an early warning system for preventing adverse events or medical errors [12] . For this reason, considerable research regarding near misses has been performed [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . In addition, some countries such as the USA, Canada, and UK have established national reporting systems to manage patient safety [17] and they make an effort to reduce not only adverse events, but also near misses [18] . Particularly, in the USA, hospitals should report near misses and adverse events to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) [19] . The Joint Commission provides standards and universal protocols to prevent errors that can occur at medical institutes [20] .
However, in the case of Korea, little is known 
Ⅱ . Materials and Methods

Questionnaire development
After reviewing the relevant literature [4-6, 14-19,21,22] (1) Preventing a surgery from being performed on the wrong body part in a patient (2) Preventing a surgery from being performed on a wrong patient (3) Preventing a wrong surgical procedure from being performed on a patient (4) Detecting unintended retention of a foreign object in a patient after operation or other procedure (5) Preventing operation-related infection resulting from the use of contaminated drugs, devices, or biologics provided by the healthcare facility during pre-op or intra-op the reason why they did not report. Table 1 shows the 26 core types of near misses and the 4 questions about preventability and reporting barriers among all questions except general characteristics such as sex, age, job classification, and working area.
Survey
There were a total of 697 healthcare professionals who were eligible for participation, 
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Ⅲ . Results
Response rate
Among the 697 eligible hospital employees, a total of 432 healthcare professionals participated in the survey (overall response rate: (Table 3) .
2) Operation-related near miss
Questions for operation-related near misses were only for RNs because other professionals in this study were not relevant to operation.
20 RNs experienced 29 cases among 6 types of near misses. Prevention of operation-related infection was most common (10 reports), followed by preventing unintended retention of a foreign object (8 reports), identifying the wrong body part before surgery (5 reports), and identifying the wrong surgical procedure before it was performed (5 reports) ( Table 3) . (Table 3) . (Table 3 ).
E. Transfusion
There were 6 RNs who answered that they experienced preventing transfusion of ABO/ HLA-incompatible blood or blood products (Table 3) .
Opinions regarding preventability and reporting of near misses
We asked about preventability, contributing and" concerns about bad evaluation from supervisor or boss"(13.9%) ( Table 4) . reporting are unclear, and perceived risk of civil litigation [15] . As noted, the fear of blame was the main reason not to report in our study. It may be because errors are considered human errors under a punitive culture rather than systematic errors; thus, when errors occur, individuals will be blamed and must take responsibility for the error [24] . Establishing a non-punitive climate might reduce the fear of reporting and encourage more open communication regarding patient safety [27] . Lastly, we should check whether our reporting system is well designed and functioning. The system should be non-punitive, confidential, independent, timely, system-oriented, responsive, and based on expert analysis [28] .
There are some limitations in this study. First, this study explored the current status of near misses through a self-administered survey.
Therefore, respondents might under-report their near misses and recall bias might occur. Second, we could not grasp the real number of near misses because they were not based on patients' chart review and we did not investigate near misses from medical doctors. Lastly, the results in this study were from just one university hospital setting so it might not represent other healthcare settings.
Ⅴ. Conclusion
Our study showed that about half of hospital workers experienced at least one or more near misses during the past one year and over 95% of near misses could be prevented. However, more than half of respondents did not report the near miss and the main reason for omission was due to fear of blame. In patient safety issues, near misses are a very significant factor because they can be a potential adverse event identified before it results in harm to the patient. Therefore, we should grasp the size of the problem through tracking and analyzing near misses and should make an effort to reduce them. To do so, we should check whether our reporting system is well-designed and functioning. In addition, we should make an effort to 
